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Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause?:
Climate Change and Food Security
Michael Barsa1
I. INTRODUCTION
Current jurisprudence under the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution generally prohibits states from discriminating against, or treating differently,
products solely based upon the jurisdiction in which the product was produced or
manufactured.2 Typically this means that states may not ban or levy higher taxes or fees
on products originating from other states. This is true even if the discrimination does not
occur at the state border itself, so long as the effect is to disproportionately burden
interstate commerce. For example, without a compelling justification, a city may not
make it unlawful to sell pasteurized milk that has not been processed and bottled within
five miles of the city. 3 Even though other in-state milk producers are also harmed,
because the effect is to exclude out-of-state milk producers, the city has nonetheless
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. As the Supreme Court said in just such a case,
dealing with the city of Madison: “To permit Madison to adopt a regulation not essential
for the protection of local health interests and placing a discriminatory burden on
interstate commerce would invite a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive
of the very purpose of the Commerce Clause.”4 The principle at stake, according to the
Court, was that “one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of
economic isolation.”5
Indeed, the dangers of state economic isolation were expounded upon at some
length in 1935 by the Supreme Court in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc.6 In that case, the
Court worried that “all that a state will have to do in times of stress and strain is to say
that its farmers and merchants and workmen must be protected against competition from
without, lest they go upon the poor relief lists or perish altogether. To give entrance to
1

Professor of Practice and Co-Director of the Environmental Law Concentration, Northwestern Pritzker
School of Law.
2
See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38 (2008) (“The modern law of what has come to be
called the dormant Commerce Clause is driven by concern about economic protectionism—that is,
regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state
competitors.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted); see also Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v.
Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1089 (2013) (noting that “the Supreme Court has consistently recognized facial
discrimination where a statute or regulation distinguished between in-state and out-of-state products and no
nondiscriminatory reason for the distinction was shown”).
3
See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951).
4
Id.
5
Id. (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935), which deemed this principle the
“overmastering requirement”).
6
See 294 U.S. at 523–27.
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that excuse would be to invite a speedy end of our national solidarity.”7 By contrast, the
Court noted, the Constitution was “framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several
states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in
union and not division.”8
Interestingly, the Court expounds upon these constitutional justifications without
citing the words of the Constitution itself. This is perhaps not surprising, given the fact
that the Dormant Commerce Clause had not always been interpreted in such a strict
fashion. Indeed, the “strong” version of the Dormant Commerce Clause—the one that
treats the United States as one great free trade zone, with very few exceptions—was only
developed during and after World War II, and was a departure from earlier interpretations
that gave much wider latitude to state regulation. Of course, this post-World War II
period was also a time when the entire world was focused on lowering barriers to trade in
order to help prevent future conflicts, through mechanisms such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was originally negotiated in 1947.9 In effect, a
more robust Dormant Commerce Clause was one more song to free trade amid a rising
chorus of similar singers.
The question now is whether that song still resonates: whether the policy
rationales behind a robust national free trade zone remain paramount or whether new
exigencies warrant another alteration of the doctrine. In particular, the question is
whether climate change—and the existential threat it poses to many areas of life—
warrants a policy that focuses more on resilience, and whether resilience can be best
achieved, at least in some areas, with an approach that actually favors states being more
isolated, and hence insulated, from climate shocks elsewhere.
This Paper seeks to develop a plausible line of argument—bolstered by data on
food production and adverse climate events—that states do have some latitude under the
current doctrine to become more resilient by fostering local agriculture, but that some
clarification—perhaps even change—in the doctrine may be necessary in order to deal
with the inevitable climate adversity to come. In essence, the argument boils down to the
idea that greater crop diversity—both in terms of location and genetics—will become
ever more urgent as the era of climate stability ends. While it might make sense to
centralize crop production in areas that we know present favorable growing conditions,
and to use fast-growing monocultures to maximize yield in those areas, this system
becomes extremely vulnerable when the climate behaves in extreme or unpredictable
ways—when a drought or flood or heat event targets the centralized growing region, or
when a pest takes advantage of climate change to move into new areas where
monocultures are preferentially vulnerable to it.
This Paper contends that a “softening” of the Dormant Commerce Clause—
especially for rain-fed agriculture, which is particularly vulnerable to such climate
stressors—can be a useful tool in encouraging diversity. Although there is considerable
room for states to maneuver even under the current doctrine, the goal of such a move
7

Id. at 523.
Id.
9
See Chad P. Bown & Douglas A. Irwin, The GATT’s Starting Point: Tariff Levels Circa 1947 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21782, 2015), for an illuminating discussion of average preGATT tariff levels.
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would be to allow states to encourage more local production of food that would otherwise
be priced out of the market. In economic terms, a softer Dormant Commerce Clause
would mark a trade-off: allowing higher average food prices with some cushion against
price spikes in the event of climate shocks, versus lower average prices with greater
price-spike vulnerability. In financial terms, such a move would broaden the portfolio of
crops, so that a crash in any given crop or region would not prove as disastrous. While a
rigorous empirical analysis of this trade-off, taking into account international trade, is
beyond the scope of this Paper, my hope is to at least frame and begin the necessary
debate.
Part I of this Paper outlines modern agriculture’s climate vulnerability in the wake
of several decades of Green Revolution “success.” This Part focuses on recent climate
events such as the ongoing California drought, as well as projections of future crop losses
due to drought, heat, flood, and pests, and the ways in which the modern agriculture
system is increasingly vulnerable to such events due to geographic concentration and
narrowing crop genetics. Part II then discusses the ways in which free trade regimes
exacerbate these vulnerabilities in entirely expected ways. Part III analyzes the Dormant
Commerce Clause as it has come to be interpreted, and shows what latitude states
currently have to promote local agriculture and what a “softening” of the doctrine might
look like in order to allow for greater climate resilience. Finally, Part IV describes how a
subsidy scheme might work to encourage crop diversity and address the climate
vulnerabilities described in earlier parts of the Paper.
II. MODERN AGRICULTURE’S C LIMATE VULNERABILITY
a.

Declining Geographic Diversity

In many ways, modern agricultural systems are a tremendous success story—if
success is measured solely by the amount of total food calories produced. From 1948 to
2013, total U.S. food production rose by almost 270%.10 By 2000, the aggregate U.S.
food supply produced 3,800 calories per person per day, 500 calories above the 1970
level.11 U.S. consumers ate a whopping fifty-seven pounds more meat annually in 2000
than in the 1950s.12
But lurking behind this success has been a dramatic decrease in the diversity of
crops and growing regions, as described below. Let us begin with the agricultural sector’s
aggregate physical footprint. From 1948 to 2013, at the same time that U.S. food
production skyrocketed, the share of land devoted to farming actually decreased by about
35%. 13 While this can be seen as a tremendous success—if success is measured in
See Agricultural Productivity in the U.S., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.ers.usda.gov/dataproducts/agricultural-productivity-in-the-us/agricultural-productivity-in-theus/#National%20Tables,%201948-2013 (follow “Table 1-Indices of farm output, input, and total factor
productivity for the United States, 1948-2013” hyperlink).
11
See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURE FACT BOOK 14 (2002),
http://www.4uth.gov.ua/usa/english/trade/files/2002factbook.pdf.
12
Id. at 15.
13
See Agricultural Productivity in the U.S., supra note 10.
10
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efficiency, and perhaps even environmental “footprint,” terms—it also highlights how
narrow the geographic base for agriculture has become.
At the same time that farmers were growing ever more crops on ever less land, they
were planting ever fewer kinds of crops on that land. In 1900, the average number of
commodities produced per farm was approximately five; by 2002 that figure was less
than two.14 Note that this figure actually understates the narrowing effect, because the
average farm size also ballooned from about 150 acres to nearly 450 acres during that
time (and the number of total farms decreased from nearly 6,000 to about 2,000).15 In
other words, in 1900 farmers were growing a more diverse array of crops over a
relatively small farm area, while today farmers grow only a few crops over a relatively
large area, even as the total area devoted to farming has shrunk.
None of this is particularly surprising. There have been many accounts in the local
and national news media documenting the death of the small family farm, the rise of large
“agri-business” operations, and the lack of crop diversity on those mega-farms.16 Indeed,
these trends are all mutually reinforcing, as large farms achieve economies of scale that
allow them to undercut—and drive out of business—smaller and less efficient
operations. 17 To put some numbers to these comparisons, while farms with less than
$5,000 of annual sales accounted for about 50% of farms in 2007, they generated less
than 1% of farm sales, while larger farms—those with sales over $500,000—represented
only 5% of farms, yet had 74% of sales.18 “This means that just 116,286 farms accounted
for almost three fourths of all the value of sales of agricultural products in the country.”19
As one source succinctly puts it: “Large farms now dominate crop production in the
United States.”20

14

CAROLYN DIMITRI, ANNE EFFLAND & NEILSON CONKLIN, THE 20TH CENTURY TRANSFORMATION OF U.S.
AGRICULTURE AND FARM POLICY 5 (2005).
15
Id.
16
See, e.g., Maggie Koerth-Baker, Big Farms are Getting Bigger and Most Small Farms Aren’t Really
Farms at All, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 17, 2016), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/big-farms-aregetting-bigger-and-most-small-farms-arent-really-farms-at-all/; Sweeping Study of U.S. Farm Data Shows
Loss of Crop Diversity the Past 34 Years, PHYS.ORG, (Sept. 15, 2016), https://phys.org/news/2015-09-farmloss-crop-diversity-years.html; Roberto Ferdman, The Decline of the Small American Family Farm in one
Chart, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/09/16/thedecline-of-the-small-american-family-farm-in-one-chart/?utm_term=.fea6c868f4f2; Mark Koba, Meet the
‘4%’: Small Number of Farms Dominates US, CNBC (May 6, 2014),
https://www.cnbc.com/2014/05/06/state-of-american-farming-big-producers-dominate-foodproduction.html.
17
See, e.g., Catherine Morrison Paul et al., Scale Economies and Efficiency in U.S. Agriculture: Are
Traditional Farms History?, 22 J. PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS 185, 186 (2004).
18
Michael Duffy, Economies of Size in Production Agriculture, 4 J. HUNGER & ENVTL. NUTRITION 375,
379 (2009).
19
Id. at 390. Note that many of the smaller farms in this comparison may not truly be commercial farming
operations at all, because the USDA defines a farm as “any place from which $1000 or more of agricultural
products were produced and sold, or normally would have been sold, during the census year.” Id. at 378.
Over 30% of farms in the census have sales of less than $1000. Id.
20
JAMES M. MACDONALD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., FARM SIZE AND THE
ORGANIZATION OF U.S. CROP FARMING 1 (2013),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/45108/39359_err152.pdf?v=41526.
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This is true despite the fact that farm size on average has held fairly steady over the
past three decades.21 Essentially, mid-sized farms have been squeezed out, leading to an
increasing number of very small farms and very large farms.22 This trend has continued
despite the fact that “the average cost curve of most agricultural production is Lshaped.”23 In other words, average costs decrease most during the transition from small to
medium size farms, but then remain relatively flat above a certain size range. Nonetheless,
“[i]ncreases in size beyond where the curve becomes flat lead to increased income,” even
if not increased efficiency.24 This is especially attractive to many farmers who face tight
margins, which means they must increase production to produce an adequate income.25
Not only do individual large farms grow relatively few crops over a large area, but
these crops are also heavily concentrated in just a few types. In 2007, corn, soybeans, hay,
and wheat accounted for over 83% of all harvested acres, with corn alone accounting for
nearly 28% of all harvested acres.26 Not surprisingly, these staple crops are increasingly
grown in larger farms. For example, the midpoint acreage for a corn farm tripled over
only twenty years, from 200 acres in 1987 to 600 acres in 2007. 27 Midpoint acreages for
soybeans, wheat, cotton, and rice all more than doubled over the same time period.28
The concentration of these crops can also be described geographically. In recent
decades, as livestock and crop production have separated, farming regions have become
increasingly specialized.29 “Corn Belt states concentrated more heavily on the production
and sale of feed crops, and livestock production moved from the Corn Belt to Mountain,
Southeastern, and Southern Plains.”30 For example, in “Corn Belt 4”—Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, and Ohio—the crop share of regional cash receipts went from 29% in 1950 to 68%
in 2010, and the corn and soybean share of crop receipts went from 63% in 1950 to 93%
in 2010.31 These shifts also affected farm size. “Cropland declined in regions with hilly
topography and mixed land use—cropland interspersed with forests, residences, and
commercial uses—and shifted toward regions with flatter land and more of the land base
devoted to crops.”32
b.

Declining Genetic Diversity

Another effect of this tremendous farm consolidation has been the narrowing
genetic base of the few crops that are planted. In other words, when large farms plant a
21

Id. at 4.
Id.
23
Duffy, supra note 18, at 389.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 20, at 11.
27
Id. at 12. The “midpoint acreage” is defined as the “farm size, in harvested acres, at which half of all
harvested acres are on larger [farms] and half on smaller [farms].” Id.
28
Id.
29
See id. at 37; Price Edwin et al., The Dilemma of Biodiversity and Specialization in Agricultural
Development, 5 J. DEV. & AGRIC. ECON. 168, 169 (2013); see generally Mary Eschelbach Gregson, LongTerm Trends in Agricultural Specialization in the United States: Some Preliminary Results, 70 AGRIC.
HIST. 90 (1996).
30
MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 20, at 37.
31
Id. at 38.
32
Id.
22
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given crop such as corn, the varieties of corn planted on that farm tend to decrease. In
many cases, this is because the variety of crop planted is genetically engineered to
tolerate herbicides or resist pests. Over 90% of U.S. corn, soybean, cotton, canola, and
sugar beet acreage was planted with genetically engineered (GE) crops in 2014.33 Crops
engineered to be both herbicide tolerant (HT) and pest resistant (Bt), accounted for 76%
of field corn acres and 79% of cotton acreage in 2014.34
The purpose of this Paper is not to debate the merits or demerits of GE crops.
Instead, it is to make the simple point that no matter what one thinks of GE crops, such
crops tend to narrow the genetic base of what is planted. Farmers (and seed companies)
tend to concentrate on only a few types of GE seeds for any given crop, and such seeds,
due to their herbicide- and pest-resistance and their fast-growing nature, tend to crowdout traditional “landrace” crops. 35 It is an incontrovertible fact that “[c]rop genetic
diversity also declines as landraces are displaced by scientifically developed modern
varieties.”36 Of course, “[i]n the broadest sense, alteration and narrowing of crop genetic
diversity began with the first domestication of wild plants.”37 Nonetheless, the current
rate of genetic engineering, combined with financial pressures and other factors, has
radically narrowed the genetic base of most major crops in the United States.
The issue of genetic narrowing, however, is not without its controversies. First,
there is the issue of whether there is a real genetic narrowing and whether such narrowing
is the same for all crops. For example, genetic narrowing might actually be worse for
wheat than for corn, given that corn “cross-pollinates,” meaning that different varieties—
even genetically engineered ones—can breed. 38 “Because of this feature, corn
populations are inherently less stable genetically. Therefore, corn landraces may be very
diverse genetically. Furthermore, if farmers continue to replant seed (even from hybrids
or other scientifically improved corn varieties) rather than buying new seed, the resulting
progeny may also be quite genetically diverse.”39
The rub, of course, is that corn farmers by and large do not replant seeds but rather
buy new seeds each year, a trend that pre-dated the advent of GE crops, but has certainly

CATHERINE GREENE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE
COEXISTENCE OF ORGANIC, GENETICALLY ENGINEERED (GE), AND NON-GE CROPS 3 (2016),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/44041/56750_eib-149.pdf?v=42424.
34
Id. at 3 n.2.
35
A “landrace” is “a dynamic population(s) of a cultivated plant that has historical origin, distinct identity
and lacks formal crop improvement, as well as often being genetically diverse, locally adapted and
associated with traditional farming systems.” Tania Carolina Camacho Villa et al., Defining and Identifying
Crop Landraces, 3 PLANT GENETIC RES. 373, 373 (2006). In other words, a “landrace” is a cultivated crop
(not a wild variety), but one that has been improved without the use of modern genetic engineering. It also
bears some local adaptations that may be different from the local adaptations in other populations of the
plant elsewhere.
36
KELLY DAY RUBENSTEIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., CROP GENETIC
RESOURCES: AN ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 14 (2005),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/44121/17452_eib2_1_.pdf?v=41055.
37
Id. at 15.
38
See id. at 16 (“Unlike wheat and rice, which self-pollinate, corn cross-pollinates, which means that one
plant is often fertilized by another.”).
39
Id.
33
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been accelerated by it. 40 As a result, “[l]arge swathes of the Midwest are effectively
devoted to monoculture, with single varieties of maize covering hundreds or thousands of
contiguous acres.”41 According to Major Goodman, a plant geneticist at North Carolina
State University, only six (of about 300) “races” of maize “are represented in the maize
of commerce, and the maize of commerce of the United States includes only one race.
We are relying on the use of a very narrow but very elite germ plasm base . . . .” 42
Moreover, “[w]ithin the one maize race used in the United States there were in the early
1900s thousands if not tens of thousands of open-pollinated varieties . . . . Essentially
each farm had its own variety . . . .”43 That variety, however, has largely disappeared: “It
is virtually impossible to find a widely used U.S. hybrid whose parentage can be traced to
neither Reid’s nor Lancaster [two open-pollinated hybrid varieties] . . . .”44
The issue of fast-growing modern hybrid monocultures driving out more traditional
landraces is not limited to maize, nor to the United States. Rather, it has been a
worldwide phenomenon affecting most staple crops, even ones that are not genetically
engineered. “Basically, we are increasing productivity—and usually stability—at the cost
of variability of virtually every crop. . . .”45 This loss of variability is especially stark for
food staples such as corn or rice. In tropical Asia, for example, 95% of high-yield rice
varieties are based on a single dwarfing gene, and in countries such as Indonesia and Sri
Lanka, approximately 75% of cultivated rice varieties are descended from a common
stock.46 Other countries don’t fare much better. “In Sri Lanka, where farmers grew some
2,000 traditional varieties of rice as recently as 1959, only five principal varieties are
grown today.”47 Similarly,

Dan Charles, Top Five Myths of Genetically Modified Seeds, Busted, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 18, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2012/10/18/163034053/top-five-myths-of-genetically-modified-seedsbusted (“By the time Monsanto got into the seed business, most farmers in the U.S. and Europe were
already relying on seed that they bought every year from older seed companies. This is especially true of
corn farmers, who’ve been growing almost exclusively commercial hybrids for more than half a century. (If
you re-plant seeds from hybrids, you get a mixture of inferior varieties.).”).
41
CHARLES C. MANN, FORD FOUND., POLITICAL ECON. RESEARCH INST., DIVERSITY ON THE FARM 10
(2004), https://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/Mann.pdf.
42
M. M. Goodman, Genetic and Germ Plasm Stocks Worth Conserving, 81 J. HEREDITY 11, 13 (1990). A
few terms here are worth defining further. While the term “race” is no longer used much, even for plants, it
is a category meant to mark differences within a species. Professor Goodman, in an earlier work, referenced
the following definitions: that a race can be defined “as a group of related individuals with enough
characteristics in common to permit their recognition as a group” or “a group of individuals with a
significant number of genes in common, major races having a smaller number in common than do subraces.” See WILLIAM L. BROWN & MAJOR M. GOODMAN, RACES OF CORN, in CORN AND CORN
IMPROVEMENT 49 (1977). A “race” is perhaps best understood in relative terms, as a category within a
species and sometimes synonymous with a sub-species, and within which there can be different varieties.
While these terms and notions are hardly precise, they are nonetheless useful for describing the larger
picture, namely the loss of genetic variability among crops.
43
Goodman, supra note 42, at 13.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
See Genetic Diversity in Rice: Table 20, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS: AGRIC. & CONSUMER
PROTECTION DEP’T, http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/Y4751E/y4751e0b.htm#TopOfPage (last visited Sept.
24, 2017).
47
See Robert E. Rhoades, The World’s Food Supply at Risk, 179 NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC MAG. 74, 83 (1991).
40
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India has probably grown over 30,000 different indigenous varieties or
landraces of rice. This situation has, in the last 20 years, changed
drastically and it is predicted that in another 20 years, rice diversity will be
reduced to 50 varieties, with the top 10 accounting for over three-quarters
of the sub-continent’s rice acreage.48
Gradually, traditional varieties of rice, like corn, are being replaced by modern
varieties. For example, in one of the largest rice producers, Vietnam, only 17% of the rice
growing area in 1980 was planted with modern varieties; that figure climbed to over 94%
in 2002.49
c.

How The Lack of Geographic and Genetic Diversity Increases Vulnerability

Putting together all the data, the picture becomes clear. Fewer varieties of staple
crops are grown on large farms, which are themselves more and more highly
concentrated in fewer growing regions. A cursory look at the state-level data bears this
out. For example, Iowa and Illinois alone contribute approximately 33% of the national
production of corn,50 while Kansas alone produces 24% of the national production of
winter wheat.51
The risks of such two-dimensional concentration—of geography and of genetics—
are similar to the easily understood risks of a lack of diversity in a financial portfolio.
This Paper focuses on two interrelated risks: the risk of adverse weather events and the
risk of pests and disease. Both risks focus on the same core scenario: that major crop
losses in the areas of concentrated food production would jeopardize food security across
the nation, and perhaps even globally.

48

See David Ehrenfeld, Globalisation: Effects on Biodiversity, Environment and Society, 1 CONSERVATION
& SOC’Y 99, 100 (2003), http://www.conservationandsociety.org/article.asp?issn=09724923;year=2003;volume=1;issue=1;spage=99;epage=111;aulast=Ehrenfeld.
49
See Tran Thi Ut & Kei Kajisa, The Impact of Green Revolution on Rice Production in Vietnam, 44
DEVELOPING ECON. 167, 174 (2006).
50
See What Region of the United States is Corn Production Prevalent, WORLDATLAS,
http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-region-of-the-united-states-is-corn-production-prevalent.html
(last visited Oct. 27, 2017) (citing 2016 statistics from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s National
Agricultural Statistics Service); Rob Cook, Ranking of States that Produce the Most Corn, BEEF2LIVE
(Oct. 23, 2017), http://beef2live.com/story-states-produce-corn-0-107129 (citing same). Indeed, according
to 2010-2012 data, just 220 counties accounted for a whopping 50% of U.S. corn production. See Dept. of
Agric. & Consumer Econ., Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign, Concentration of Corn and Soybean
Production in the U.S., FARMDOC DAILY (July 9, 2013),
http://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2013/07/concentration-corn-soybean-production.html.
51
See CME: Wheat Feeding, Impact on Corn Demand, PIG SITE (Apr. 18, 2011),
http://www.thepigsite.com/swinenews/26259/cme-wheat-feeding-impact-on-corn-demand/. Note that
winter wheat represents 70–80% of total U.S. wheat production. See Background: U.S. Wheat Supply, U.S.
DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV.: WHEAT,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/wheat/background.aspx#supply (last updated Nov. 23, 2016).
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Adverse Weather

One of the most common misconceptions surrounding climate change is that its
primary effect will be to cause a gradual warming of the globe.52 This is not to say that
warming will not occur, simply that temperature does not bear an easy linear relationship
to CO2 concentrations. 53 Temperatures may begin—indeed, have already begun—to
swing wildly in different parts of the globe even as the overall trend is one of increasing
temperatures.54 Another way to put this is that, at least in the short- to medium-term, the
primary effect of climate change will be to destabilize what has been, over the past
12,000 years, a remarkably stable climate period in earth’s history. 55 This climate
stability itself formed the precondition to agriculture and, by extension, settled urban
civilization. 56 The absence of such stability leaves agricultural systems extremely
vulnerable. In particular, heat, drought, and flood threaten agricultural systems in ways
that are unprecedented over the course of human civilization.57
The issue of heat is an especially sensitive one for heat-sensitive crops such as corn.
“Corn was originally a tropical grass from the high elevation areas of central Mexico
about 7,400 feet above sea level, 2,000 feet higher than Denver. Today, corn still prefers
conditions typical of that area—warm daytime temperatures and cool nights.”58 High heat,
especially when combined with drought, disrupts the pollination of the corn plant, which
is essential for creating the “ears” of corn consumed and used by humans.59 In particular,
sustained daily high temperatures in excess of thirty degrees Celsius leads to a marked
decline in corn yields. 60 There is a direct effect of heat on the corn plant itself, but
perhaps even more importantly, sustained high heat contributes to water stress, which has
a profoundly negative impact on corn yields.61
Unfortunately, the U.S. Corn Belt is extremely vulnerable to such rising
temperatures. Recent climate models show the U.S. Corn Belt to be an area highly
See COMM. ON ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE:
INEVITABLE SURPRISES 10 (2002).
53
Id. (noting that “[t]he climate system in the past has made large jumps between typical patterns of
behavior . . . . Especially large and abrupt climate changes have occurred repeatedly over the last 100,000
years during the slide into and climb out of the most recent global ice age”); see also id. at 74 (“In a linear
model, doubling the forcing doubles the response. The linear approach does not hold for abrupt climate
change, in which a small forcing can cause a small change or a huge one.”).
54
See, e.g., Ashley Potero, Warm-to-Freezing Winter Temperature Fluctuations may be Connected to
Global Warming: Study, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/warm-freezing-wintertemperature-fluctuations-may-be-connected-global-warming-study-363550.
55
See, e.g., GABRIELE GRAMELSBERGER & JOHANN FEICHTER, CLIMATE CHANGE AND POLICY: THE
CALCULABILITY OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CHALLENGE OF UNCERTAINTY 10 (2011).
56
Id.
57
See Damian Carrington, Shattered Records show Climate Change is an Emergency Today, Scientists
Warn, GUARDIAN (June 17, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jun/17/shatteredrecords-climate-change-emergency-today-scientists-warn.
58
See Tom Hoegemeyer, How Extended High Heat Disrupts Corn Pollination, U. NEBRASKA-LINCOLN:
CROPWATCH (Aug. 1, 2011), http://cropwatch.unl.edu/how-extended-high-heat-disrupts-corn-pollination-0.
59
Id.
60
David Lobell et al., The Critical Role of Extreme Heat for Maize Production in the United States, 3
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 497, 497–99 (2013).
61
Id.
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sensitive to heat stress, with American corn production “fac[ing] a notable decrease [in
production] in all scenarios.”62 Using a crop model that combines historical climate and
yield data with fifteen different global temperature models, researchers estimated that
aggregate yields in the U.S. Corn Belt are projected to decrease by an average of 18% by
20302050 relative to 19802000. 63 Perhaps even more disturbing is the extreme
volatility of yields under these future climate scenarios, with the coefficient of variation
of yield increasing by an average of 47%.64 Even if increased atmospheric CO2 levels
could offset some of these losses in the near-term in some model scenarios—for example,
as corn, in the presence of high CO2, reduces water transpiration losses by narrowing the
stomatal pores on their leaf surfaces, making them more resistant to water stress—by the
end of the century, especially under high emission scenarios, the negative effects still
predominate.65
Heat is of course related to drought, and the two working together pose added
dangers to crop production in the central growing regions of the United States. Looking
at field data on corn and soybean yields from 1995 through 2012, it appears that even
though overall yields have increased, the sensitivity of yields to drought stress associated
with high vapor pressure deficits has increased.66 Essentially, “as farmers become more
adept at removing all nonwater constraints to crop production, the sensitivity to drought
generally increases.” 67 Indeed, one result is that climate change effects may be more
severe than predicted by models, with corn and soybean yields potentially being reduced
by 15% to 30% over the next fifty years.68
We need look no further than recent history to see the devastating effects of drought,
which in extreme cases can lead to crop losses well in excess of the model predictions
cited above. In 2011, for example, Texas suffered the driest—and until then the hottest—
year on record.69 Agricultural losses that year were estimated to be $7.62 billion (out of
62

Delphine Deryng et al., Global Crop Yield Response to Extreme Heat Stress Under Multiple Climate
Change Futures, 9 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 5 (2014), http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/17489326/9/3/034011/pdf.
63
Daniel Urban et al., Projected Temperature Changes Indicate Significant Increase in Interannual
Variability of U.S. Maize Yields, 112 CLIMATIC CHANGE 525, 531 (2012).
64
Id.
65
Daniel W. Urban et al., The Impacts of Future Climate and Carbon Dioxide Changes on the Average and
Variability of U.S. Maize Yields Under Two Emission Scenarios, 10 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 2 (2015),
http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/10/4/045003/pdf.
66
David Lobell et al., Greater Sensitivity to Drought Accompanies Maize Yield Increase in the U.S.
Midwest, 344 SCIENCE 516, 516 (2014). Vapor pressure deficit “is a widely used measure of atmospheric
water demand that depends on air temperature and humidity and has a strong influence on plant growth
rates in these systems.” Id. at 517. Essentially, a high vapor pressure deficit means that the air outside the
plant is much dryer than the air inside the plant, leading the plant to lose moisture at an increasing rate. See
Vapor Pressure Deficit–The Hidden Force on your Plants, JUST 4 GROWERS: TEMPERATURE HUMIDITY &
CO2, http://www.just4growers.com/stream/temperature-humidity-and-c02/vapor-pressure-deficit-thehidden-force-on-your-plants.aspx (last visited Aug. 31, 2017).
67
Lobell et al., supra note 66, at 519.
68
Id.
69
David P. Anderson, Professor & Extension Specialist, Dep’t of Agric. Econ., Tex. A&M AgrilLife
Extension, & Andy Vestal, Professor & Extension Specialist, Dep’t of Agric. Leadership, Tex. A&M
AgrilLife Extension, 2010-2014 Texas Agriculture: The Economic Impact of Drought, Presentation at the
National EDEN Annual Meetings (Oct. 23, 2014),
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$16 billion in annual agricultural cash receipts), which is likely a conservative estimate
because it includes only major crops.70 Production of wheat, cotton, and corn fell by over
50% relative to the five-year average.71 Similarly, the California drought was estimated to
cause $2.7 billion in economic losses in 2015, and led to an almost 50% reduction in
surface water resources. 72 California was fortunately able to make up for some of its
surface water resources by pumping more groundwater,73 but this is likely a temporary
measure, as groundwater is much slower to recharge and is not considered a “renewable”
resource in the same way that surface water is.74
Globally, researchers have estimated that from 1964 to 2007, losses of major cereal
crops (maize, rice, and wheat) due to extreme drought events averaged about 10.1% and
losses due to extreme heat events averaged about 9.1%.75 Moreover, the problem appears
to be getting worse over time, as “more recent droughts (19852007) caused cereal
production losses averaging 13.7%, greater than the estimated 6.7% during earlier
droughts (19641984).”76 Interestingly, crop losses were also worse among developed
countries. “Cereals in the more technically developed agricultural systems of North
America, Europe and Australasia suffered most from droughts, facing on average a 19.9%
production deficit compared to 12.1% in Asia, 9.2% in Africa, and no significant effect in
Latin America and the Caribbean.” 77 One explanation for this difference in drought
sensitivity is that the developed countries have more large-scale monocultures that are
more drought-sensitive, whereas there is “a tendency among lower-income countries to
encompass diverse crops and management across many small fields, which may allow for
some fields to resist drought better than others.”78

http://eden.lsu.edu/Conferences/EDENAM/2014/Documents/Plenary/2014_Impact%20of%20Drought%20i
n%20Texas_NationalEDEN.pdf.
70
Id.; Blair Fannin, Updated 2011 Texas Agricultural Drought Losses Total $7.62 Billion, AGRILIFE (Mar.
21, 2012), http://today.agrilife.org/2012/03/21/updated-2011-texas-agricultural-drought-losses-total-7-62billion/.
71
Id.; Anderson & Vestal, supra note 69.
72
RICHARD HOWITT ET AL., CTR. FOR WATERSHED SCIS., U.C. DAVIS, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE 2015
DROUGHT FOR CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE ES-1 (2015),
https://watershed.ucdavis.edu/files/biblio/Final_Drought%20Report_08182015_Full_Report_WithAppendi
ces.pdf.
73
Id.
74
Unfortunately, when (and if) the rains do eventually return in a climate-changed world, they come with a
vengeance. Increasingly, we see a “see-sawing” between extreme weather events that itself poses severe
challenges for agriculture, with an increased incidence (rather than magnitude) of flooding across the
central United States. See Iman Mallakpour & Gabriele Villarini, The Changing Nature of Flooding Across
the Central United States, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 250, 250–54 (2015). For example, in 2015, on the
heels of the 2011 Texas drought, came flood conditions that threatened many Texas farms with total losses
of their crops. See Robert Ferris, Texas Floods and Commodities: Farms Face ‘Total Loss for Year,’
CNBC (May 29, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/29/texas-floods-and-commodities-farms-face-totalloss-for-year.html.
75
Corey Lesk et al., Influence of Extreme Weather Disasters on Global Crop Production, 529 NATURE 84,
84 (2016).
76
Id. at 86.
77
Id. at 85.
78
Id.
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2.

Pestilence

It is this same issue of increased sensitivity that makes non-diverse monocrops also
vulnerable to pests. “A pathogen that attacks the predominant commercial variety of a
food crop can inflict immense costs on society. The classic example of this is the Irish
potato famine of the 19th century.”79 Other more recent examples include “the loss of a
significant fraction of the Asian rice crop to the grassy stunt virus;” the southern corn leaf
blight epidemic of 1970 that “resulted in enormous losses” and was “caused by excessive
homogeneity of the USA’s tremendous maize hectarage;” “the tropical maize rust
epidemic in Africa in the 1950s and the blue mould epidemic on tobacco in the USA and
Europe in the 1960s.”80 Even the conventional banana is not immune. In the 1950s, the
“Panama disease” fungus wiped out the most-exported variety of banana in the world, the
Gros Michel, causing the Gros Michel to be replaced by the Cavendish, a banana that was
immune to the disease.81 The problem lies in the fact that practically all bananas grown
for export are clones of the first Cavendish plant, and now the fungus has evolved to
destroy that variety, while efforts to develop resistance to the disease have so far failed.82
Genetic homogeneity not only raises the costs of an epidemic should it occur, but it
also increases the probability of such an outbreak in the first place by creating a largescale susceptible environment for a pathogen that can overcome resistance.83 Put another
way, the genetic and spatial concentration of crops creates a target rich environment for
pathogens. If the pathogen can destroy a few such crops, it can destroy them all.
Climate change may itself be exacerbating this vulnerability. Generally warmer
conditions have allowed pests to migrate further north than they otherwise would. For
example, the western corn rootworm has steadily moved further north in Europe since
1992,84 and has also migrated extensively throughout the United States, causing over $1
billion of crop damage per year and defying efforts to control it.85 On average, crop pests
are migrating northward at a rate of 1.7 miles per year, with two of the most destructive
pathogens—fungi and blight-causing oomycetes—moving northward at closer to four

79

Geoffrey Heal et al., Genetic Diversity and Interdependent Crop Choices in Agriculture, 26 RESOURCE &
ENERGY ECON. 175, 177 (2004).
80
Id. at 177–78.
81
See Duncan Leatherdale, The Imminent Death of the Cavendish Banana and Why it Affects Us All, BBC
NEWs (Jan. 24, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-35131751.
82
Id.; see also Mike Peed, We Have No Bananas, NEW YORKER (Jan. 10, 2011),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/01/10/we-have-no-bananas.
83
Heal et al., supra note 79, at 178. See also Rhoades, supra note 47, at 84 (“By relying on a few crop
strains instead of many, farmers open themselves to disaster [because] the entire crop [is] vulnerable to a
single pest or disease.”)
84
See Spread of the Western Corn Rootworm in Europe, EUR. ENVTL. AGENCY (Nov. 12, 2009),
https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/spread-of-the-western-corn-rootworm-in-europe; see
also Tom Hundley, Stowaway U.S. Corn Rootworm Eats its Way Across Europe, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
(Sept. 24, 2001), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/08/0829_wirecornworm.html (discussing
that the rootworm was unknown in Europe until the early 1990s, when it spread from the United States to
Belgrade, likely by way of international air travel).
85
See Michael Gray et al., Adaptation and Invasiveness of Western Corn Rootworm: Intensifying Research
on a Worsening Pest, 54 ANN. REV. ENTOMOLOGY 303, 304 (2009).
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miles per year.86 Rising CO2 levels themselves can also create favorable conditions for
pests.87
3.

Counter-arguments

Thus far, this Paper has outlined the vulnerabilities of geographically and
genetically concentrated crop production. But it is worth noting the counter-argument:
that this outline fails to account for the bigger picture, and that the gains from
concentrated crop production outweigh the risks. It is certainly true that, both in the
United States and worldwide, crop yields have risen tremendously since World War II
and the price of staple crops has fallen.88 However, in recent years, as yields suffer from
adverse weather events and other factors, the price of staple crops has trended upward
and has seen several sizeable price spikes.89
Overall, food commodity prices began rising in 2002, reversing a decades-long
trend of lower prices.90 The overall trend of rising prices can be attributed to factors such
as rising worldwide demand, slower yield growth, and the increased use of biofuels.91
However, there have also been notable price spikes around adverse weather events. For
example, in 2010 and 2011, there was a severe drought in Russia and other parts of
Eastern Europe that reduced production of wheat, hot and dry conditions in the U.S. Corn
and Wheat Belts followed by heavy rains, and heavy rains in Canada and Europe. 92 These
weather-related factors caused overall global food prices to rise 60% from the previous
low, while corn prices alone rose 86%.93
One might nonetheless argue that these price spikes would have occurred even if
the food supply had not been so concentrated geographically or genetically, and indeed
more empirical work needs to be done on the extent to which such factors contributed to
the crop losses. Nonetheless, it remains the case that a more disbursed food production
system would certainly be less vulnerable to adverse weather. While the global climate is
86

See Stephanie Paige Ogburn, Crop Pests on the Move Due to Climate Change, SCI. AM. (Sept. 3, 2013),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/crop-pests-on-the-move-due-to-climate-change.
87
See Ray Cannon, The Food & Env’t Research Agency, Will Climate Change Result in More Pest and
Disease Problems for Agriculture? (Dec. 1, 2010), https://www.slideshare.net/FarmingFutures/ray5995926 (stating soybeans grown at elevated CO2 concentrations attract more pests than ones grown at
current conditions).
88
See DAVID LOBEL & MARSHALL BURKE, ADVANCES IN GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH 19 (2010)
(describing increasing crop yields); MILTON C. HALLBERG, ECONOMIC TRENDS IN U.S. AGRICULTURE AND
FOOD SYSTEMS SINCE WORLD WAR II 47–49 (2001) (describing same); see also TRADE & MKTS. DIV.,
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.S., THE STATE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY MARKETS: HIGH FOOD
PRICES AND THE FOOD CRISIS–EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS LEARNED 12 (2009), http://www.fao.org/3/ai0854e.pdf (describing historic price drops).
89
See TRACY CARTY, OXFAM, EXTREME WEATHER, EXTREME PRICES 2–4 (2012),
https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/Extreme-Weather-Extreme-Prices.pdf; TRADE & MKTS.
DIV., supra note 88, at 12–14.
90
See RONALD TROSTLE ET AL., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S DEP’T. OF AGRIC., WHY HAVE FOOD
COMMODITY PRICES RISEN AGAIN? 3–4 (2011), http://www.ethanolrfa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/USDA-food-prices.pdf.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 5.
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changing, it does not change the same way everywhere at the same time. The simple fact
remains that weather patterns will be different in different localities. An adverse weather
event in one crop-growing area does not necessarily have an impact on other cropgrowing areas elsewhere. And the more crop-growing areas there are, the less likely it is
that an adverse weather event will destroy a major proportion of a given crop.
Other counter-arguments also do not seem convincing. One might argue that
geographic concentration is a positive development because it means that crops are
growing only in the “best” places and that genetic narrowing means that only the
“hardiest” varieties remain, such that crops will be more, not less, resistant to climaterelated and other stressors. Both of these arguments, however, fail to account for the
unpredictable nature of the stressors crops face. In a climate-changing world with more
extreme weather events, there is no such thing as a “best” place—there are only better
and worse places for growing crops in that season. Similarly, what a “hardy” crop means
differs depending on whether the crop is facing drought or excess rain, or whether the
relevant pathogen is a fungus or an insect or something else entirely.
One of the most insidious and unappreciated aspects of climate change is how
increasingly unpredictable it makes weather and other climate patterns from year to year.
And it is this very unpredictability that makes crop concentration—both geographic and
genetic—so dangerous. Recent attempts to predict the relationship between extreme
weather events and crop price spikes in a changing climate have suggested “a strong
upward trend in world market prices of the main traded staple crops over the next twenty
years, with a significant portion of the increase caused by climate change.” 94 Most
climate models project increasing drought in summer and precipitation in winter in the
northern hemisphere, but along with drought, “there is an increased chance of intense
precipitation and flooding due to the greater water-holding capacity of a warmer
atmosphere.”95 By 2030, extreme weather scenarios in the crop-growing regions of North
America, for example, could depress maize and wheat yields by 1825%,96 leading to
price shocks of anywhere from 33% for wheat to 140% for maize relative to an assumed
2030 baseline average world market export price.97
Obviously, such future projections are freighted with assumptions regarding land
allocations across crops (which are assumed to be fixed) and elasticities of supply and
demand. Nonetheless, they highlight the real risks of extreme weather on crop
production—risks that not only threaten to raise prices, but also threaten to lower food
consumption, especially in places such as several African countries where the average
person spends a relatively high percentage of their income on food.98
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DIRK WILLENBOCKEL, OXFAM, EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS AND CROP PRICE SPIKES IN A CHANGING
CLIMATE 4 (2012), https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/rr-extreme-weather-events-cropprice-spikes-05092012-en.pdf.
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Id. at 7.
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Id. at 19.
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Id. at 27.
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THE ROLE OF FREE TRADE

Thus far, this Paper has outlined the potential problem of concentrated farm acreage
and crop genetics in a world where extreme weather events or unusual pathogens may
wipe out a given crop growing region. The next logical question, then, is whether there is
anything that might be done to mitigate the concentration in a way that might mitigate the
risk.
There are many causes of such concentration. Economies of scale have put
tremendous pressure on farms to increase in size, especially given the increased capital
costs of mechanization. 99 Government subsidies, concentrated in only a few crops,
themselves encourage farmers to plant such crops. And consolidation in the seed and
fertilizer industries has also encouraged consolidation on the farm.
But here I would like to focus on the role of international and interstate trade. In
particular, such trade has placed a high degree of price pressure on commodity crops such
as corn, wheat, soybeans, and rice. This is especially true in a country, and world, where
free trade regimes allow more agricultural subsidies than tariffs.100 Even in theory, such
trade would encourage production of crops to concentrate in high-yielding areas and on
fast-growing hybrid varieties, in order to capture any comparative advantage.101 The fact
that this has actually occurred should be a surprise to no one.
Indeed, there is a case to be made that the welfare gains from specialization and
trade in agriculture are precisely what has allowed such high crop yields. “Because ideal
growing conditions and crop sensitivity to deviations from optimal conditions vary by
crop, different regions enjoy comparative advantage in different crops.”102 In fact, it may
be the case that re-localizing crop production would only serve to raise crop prices,
increase the use of fertilizer and other inputs, and increase the land area devoted to crop
production. 103 In other words, there is the danger that locally grown food means
inefficiently grown food, and that without large-scale technologically sophisticated farms,
the environmental cost of the same output would be far higher than it is today. 104 Indeed,
there is a robust debate about whether locally grown food even has a lower carbon
“footprint” than food grown in far-flung centralized growing regions, given the
economies of scale involved and the fact that transportation only accounts for a relatively
99

See Concentration in Agriculture: Hearing Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Appropriations, Subcomm. on
Agric., Rural Dev. & Related Agencies (2001) (statement of Keith Collins, Chief Economist, U.S. Dep’t of
Agric.).
100
See JENNIFER CLAPP, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FOOD SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: UNPACKING DISPUTED NARRATIVES 8 (2015), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5160e.pdf
(noting that the latest Agreement on Agriculture included in the Uruguay Round of GATT talks, completed
in 1994, “allowed numerous subsidy programmes to continue in industrialized countries” while “[a]t the
same time, many developing countries were obliged to open their markets to imports even though they
could not afford subsidy programmes of the type that industrialized countries had developed”).
101
See id. at 9–10 (discussing comparative advantage in food production).
102
See Steven Sexton, Does Local Production Improve Environmental and Health Outcomes?, 13 AGRIC.
& RESOURCE ECON. UPDATE 5, 6 (2009).
103
Id.
104
See Jayson Lusk, Why Industrial Farms are Good for the Environment, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/25/opinion/sunday/why-industrial-farms-are-good-for-theenvironment.html?mcubz=0 (noting that while U.S. crop production is now twice what it was in 1970,
“[a]griculture is using nearly half the labor and 16 percent less land than it did in 1970”).
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small percentage (anywhere from 3% to 16%) of the lifecycle carbon emissions of food
and only about 11% of the total carbon emissions associated with food production
itself.105
These are all serious questions that deserve to be addressed. In this Paper, however,
I focus not on carbon mitigation, but rather on adaptation—how best to adapt the food
production system to the climate change that is already occurring and will certainly occur
in the future. And it is precisely the adaptation element that is left out of the mitigation
analysis above: that in a climate-changing world, centralized crop production is
vulnerable in ways that diversified production is not. In other words, while centralized
crop production might well be better both for consumers and the environment if we hold
climate constant, such a condition appears increasingly unrealistic. Another way of
putting this is to reiterate what was stated in the last Part, namely that the “best” places
for growing certain crops may no longer be the best, and in fact there may not be a single
“best” place anymore. There may only be, year to year, better or worse places, and the
unpredictability of the climate may make it impossible to know ahead of time which is
which.
The real question, then, is whether any relaxing of free trade rules would help
mitigate the geographic and genetic concentration of crops in such a way as to mitigate
the risk of crop wipeouts. An empirical examination of this question is beyond the scope
of this Paper. It may well be the case that, for example, farm subsidies are the dominant
cause of such concentration and that relaxing free trade rules would have only a
negligible effect. However, it is undeniable that relaxing free trade rules would at least
have some effect at the margins, and may also be necessary even if subsidies are reduced.
Relaxing free trade rules would allow states to either encourage or actively protect local
production in order to provide at least some of the geographic, and likely also genetic,
diversity currently lacking. Moreover, this local production could be encouraged even if
the current concentrated food production areas remain more or less the same. In other
words, one does not have to believe that local production would have to replace the
current concentrated production. It may well be the case that the two systems could coexist. Again, this is an empirical question beyond the scope of this Paper, but given the
surging demand for food in the coming decades—some experts think more food will have
to be produced worldwide over the next fifty years than has been produced during the
past 10,000 years combined—it certainly seems like augmented local production could
serve as a plausible, and perhaps even necessary, outgrowth of the current production
system.106
105

See WAYNE WAKELAND ET AL., GREEN TECHNOLOGIES IN FOOD PRODUCTION AND PROCESSING 212
(2012) (citing estimates that in the typical household food basket, aggregate transportation accounts for just
11% of total carbon emissions of food production); id. at 225 (for animal products, transportation costs
account for only 3% of total lifetime carbon emissions, including production and processing, cooking, and
waste disposal); id. at 226 (for plant-based products, transportation accounts for about 16% of lifetime
carbon emissions).
106
See Ian Sample, Global Food Crisis Looms as Climate Change and Population Growth Strip Fertile
Land, GUARDIAN (Aug. 31, 2007),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2007/aug/31/climatechange.food (“To keep up with the growth
in human population, more food will have to be produced worldwide over the next 50 years than has been
during the past 10,000 years combined, the experts said.”).
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THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE BARRIER

One way to conceive of distributed production is to take the current political
divisions of the United States—namely the fifty states—and to try to foster local
production within each state. Of course, a division along state lines is neither compelled
by a distributional objective, nor necessarily superior to other ways we might slice the
United States. For example, there may be geographic reasons for distributing food
production in other ways that do not necessarily correspond with state borders. 107
However, given that state borders are often placed where they are because of some
relevant geographic feature such as a river, and because a distribution along state lines is
certainly the simplest and most realistic option, I will analyze that as a basis for achieving
diversity in food production.
Assuming we desire to distribute food production among the several states, we
must face the restrictions of the Dormant Commerce Clause, which prevents states from
discriminating against out-of-state products as a means of fostering in-state production.108
Two questions immediately arise. First, what, if any, state efforts to bolster local
production are possible under current Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence? And
second, if such efforts are insufficient, is there any limited way the Dormant Commerce
Clause should be changed or “softened” to foster diversity?
a.

States Acting as Market Participants

The most plausible current avenue for states to bolster local production comes from
the “market participant” exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause. The market
participant exception was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.109 Essentially, “[t]he market participant doctrine distinguishes
between a state’s role as a regulator, on the one hand, and its role as a market participant,
on the other.”110 Thus, “a state or state subdivision that acts as a market participant, rather
than a market regulator, is not subject to the restraints of the Commerce Clause.” 111 “Put
roughly, the market participant doctrine protects states when they are acting as parties to
a commercial transaction rather than (as, for example, when adopting a tax scheme) they
are acting as market regulators.”112 Under this market participant exception, the Supreme
Court has upheld state policies to confine the sale of cement by a state-operated cement
plant to residents of the state,113 and an executive order by the Mayor of Boston which
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One example might be to conceive of the Unites States as a set of crop-growing regions that span
multiple states.
108
See supra notes 6–7.
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426 U.S. 794, 807–09 (1976).
110
See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n. v. S. Coast Air Quality Maintenance Dist., 498 F.3d 1031, 1040 (2007).
111
Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming Cty., 883 F.2d 245, 249 (3d. Cir. 1989) (citation and internal
quotations omitted).
112
Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 910 (3d. Cir. 1990) (upholding a Pennsylvania law
requiring suppliers contracting with a public agency in Pennsylvania in connection with a public works
project to provide products whose steel is American-made).
113
See Reeves Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980).
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required that all construction projects funded by city funds be performed by a work force
comprised of at least half Boston residents.114
There is ample room, then, for states to purchase only in-state or local crops for use
in state programs, and there is some evidence that this is beginning to happen. Woodbury
County, Iowa, for example, has enacted a policy that mandates the county “shall purchase,
by or through its food service contractor, locally produced organic food” for the
Woodbury County jail, work release center, and juvenile detention facilities.115 There has
also been a proposal in Cleveland to give a 2% bid preference to local farmers when
contracting with the city.116 Each of these policies would seem to fall squarely within the
market participant exception, because in each case the state is simply acting as a normal
purchaser in the food market and not as a regulator of the market itself.117
Needless to say, these are relatively small-scale programs. But some states do have
considerable purchasing power in the food market, whether it be for school lunch
programs, poverty assistance, or state universities. In 20142015, for example, the State
of Pennsylvania, under its State Food Purchase Program alone, which largely goes to feed
needy residents, purchased over $15.6 million worth of food. 118 The Pennsylvania
program provides cash grants to counties for the wholesale purchase of food at
competitively bid prices and is one of the largest programs of its kind across the
country.119
In addition to purchasing food for their needy residents, states also purchase food
for K–12 lunch programs and state universities. K–12 schools in Michigan, for example,
spend about $200 million on food,120 and several school districts have pushed to increase
their purchases of local food.121 Similarly, colleges and universities in Michigan spend
about $53 million on their annual food budgets, 122 and some universities such as the
University of Michigan and Grand Valley State University have initiated local food
purchase programs as part of their sustainability drives. 123 Other states have enacted
similar “farm to school” programs, which could provide an important market for local
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food production. 124 The USDA Farm to School census estimates that $789 million is
currently spent on local farm to school programs.125 And some states hope to increase
that number in the years to come. Michigan Good Food, for example, has as its goal that
Michigan institutions will source 20% of their food products from Michigan growers,
producers, and processors by 2020.126
Moreover, when a state purchases unprocessed local food for school lunch
programs, there is no Dormant Commerce Clause barrier at all. This is because in 2008,
Congress amended the National School Lunch Act, 42 U.S.C. 1758(j), to allow
institutions to use a geographic preference in favor of locally grown unprocessed food. In
2011, the USDA enacted regulations allowing schools to use a “geographic preference”
to favor local growers of unprocessed food.127
Yet significant barriers remain. Putting aside the Dormant Commerce Clause issues,
which range, as noted, from minimal to nonexistent in this area, there are several reasons
why state institutional purchases to encourage local food production have not made
greater inroads in encouraging local production. Some of these barriers are institutional.
Michigan surveys, for example, reveal that institutional purchasers are concerned about
the seasonal availability of local food, the lack of local producers, and food safety.128
Perhaps the largest concern, though, stems from the tight budgets of school food
services.129
Budgetary concerns raise the issue of costs more generally. While local food may
not always cost more, states may be legitimately concerned that purchasing local food in
large quantities may raise food purchasing costs for the state. 130 Some states simply may
See TRICIA KOVACS ET AL., A SCHOOL’S GUIDE TO PURCHASING WASHINGTON-GROWN FOOD 1 (2012),
http://www.wafarmtoschool.org/content/documents/schoolguideflowresguidenoresources-1.pdf; see also
Overview: Farm to School Census 2015, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.: FARM TO SCH. CENSUS,
https://farmtoschoolcensus.fns.usda.gov/overview-farm-school-census-2015 (last visited Sept. 24, 2017)
(“42% of districts surveyed by USDA say they participate in farm to school activities.”).
125
See Farm to School Act of 2017, NAT’L FARM TO SCH. NETWORK, http://www.farmtoschool.org/F2SAct
(last visited Sept. 9, 2017).
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About: The Vision and Goals of the Michigan Good Food Charter, MICH. GOOD FOOD,
http://www.michiganfood.org/about (last updated Apr. 1, 2014). The Michigan Good Food organization
does not have good data on the extent to which current school food purchases come from local farmers. See
COLLEEN MATTS ET AL., supra note 120, at 12.
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provisions, to include the following language: “School food authorities participating in the Program, as
well as State agencies making purchases on behalf of such school food authorities, may apply a geographic
preference when procuring unprocessed locally grown or locally raised agricultural products. When
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not be able to afford the higher cost. There may also be a more subtle drawback in the
sense that the benefit of disbursed production is one that accrues to the nation as a whole,
while the cost would be localized in the state itself. In other words, a state may pay
higher food prices in order to encourage local production, but that local production could
in theory be shipped anywhere. This would in turn benefit residents of multiple states,
especially if the state inducements are sufficient to grow the local production base, such
that economies of scale drive costs down to a level that is competitive with the market at
large. Thus, while the state might pay a premium for local production, the state might not
capture the full benefit of such a move, while bearing the full cost. Moreover, in some
cases, such as the Woodbury policy cited above, it is not even clear that only in-state
growers would benefit, because the policy defines locally grown food as that which is
“‘grown and processed within a 100-mile radius of the Woodbury County courthouse’ in
Sioux City, Iowa.” 131 Because Sioux City is on the border, the 100-mile radius likely
extends into neighboring South Dakota and Nebraska.132 Thus, the state would bear the
full cost of higher prices, but in-state growers would not capture the full benefit of the
policy.
b.

State Subsidies

Another possible avenue for encouraging disbursed production along state lines is
to have state governments directly subsidize in-state growers. Under current Dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, in-state subsidies are generally less likely to trigger
strict scrutiny than tax breaks for in-state businesses, despite the argument that they are
economically indistinguishable. 133 In New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, for
example, the Supreme Court expressly distinguished an Indiana subsidy for local ethanol
while invalidating an Ohio tax credit against the state fuel sales tax for Ohio-produced
ethanol.134 The Court noted that:
[t]he Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action designed to give
its residents an advantage in the marketplace, but only action of that
description in connection with the State’s regulation of interstate
commerce. Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily
run afoul of that prohibition; discriminatory taxation of out-of-state
manufacturers does.135
After Limbach, then, it seemed that subsidies would generally pass Dormant
Commerce Clause muster even if economically indistinguishable from tax breaks.
However, several years later, the issue became more muddied, as in West Lynn Creamery,
IOWA 13 (2009),
http://www.agmrc.org/media/cms/Is_Local_Food_More_Expensive_0DEEF5B9A5323.pdf.
131
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132
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Inc. v. Healy, the Court noted that “[w]e have never squarely confronted the
constitutionality of subsidies, and we need not do so now.” 136 In that case, the Court
struck down a combination tax-subsidy scheme, where the state taxed all fluid milk sold
by dealers to Massachusetts retailers, and then returned the tax as a subsidy only to
Massachusetts dairy farmers.137 But what exactly made the scheme infirm: the tax or the
subsidy? The answer was not clear, which led some commentators to question whether
subsidies themselves might run afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause, despite the fact
that the Court in West Lynn Creamery itself made clear that “[a] pure subsidy funded out
of general revenue ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce, but merely
assists local business.”138
Not surprisingly, in the wake of West Lynn Creamery, there has arisen a good deal
of academic literature regarding the extent to which subsidies can, and should, escape
strict scrutiny under the Dormant Commerce Clause.139 While a subsidy given out of a
state’s general revenues would appear to be the most likely to survive challenge, and a
subsidy given out of a segregated fund that is funded by tax revenues on both in-state and
out-of-state producers would appear to fail under West Lynn Creamery, there is no clear
consensus regarding the scope of “proper” versus “improper” subsidies, and indeed
whether there should be any such thing as a “proper” discriminatory subsidy in the first
place.140
Still, subsidies do offer a promising avenue for states to bolster local food
production, especially if the subsidies are paid out of general revenues. Subsidies might
take the form of producer subsidies—aiding local farmers directly—or consumer
subsidies—aiding grocers or consumers for their purchase of locally grown food. The
point of consumer subsidies would be to make locally grown food price-competitive
(although there is no reason why in theory it could not also be used to make locally
grown food actually cheaper than the distant, mass-produced variety). The point of
producer subsidies would likely be the same, but it need not be, as producer subsidies
might also subsidize food grown only for household consumption—i.e., food that is not
part of the market at all—especially if states decide that food marketing itself imposes
certain climate-related costs, such as transportation emissions and packaging costs.
Subsidies might also be tailored to factors such as plot size, what the crop area is
136
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displacing (e.g., there could be no subsidy for crops that displace forest areas on the
theory that such displacement actually exacerbates climate change by removing a carbon
sink), and higher subsidies for crops that displace less desirable land uses such as vacant
lots, or are located in urban areas or even rooftops. The possibilities are virtually endless,
which makes subsidies at the state level particularly attractive, as states could serve as
laboratories for experimentation with different approaches.
The problem with subsidies, of course, is the same problem that plagues the market
participant ideas noted above, namely that they require states to spend money, which
many states are unwilling or simply unable to do, especially on the scale that is required.
States would also face the problem of bearing the full costs of the subsidy while not
capturing the full benefit, as noted above, given that producers remain free to sell their
goods elsewhere. Indeed, part of the point of encouraging subsidies is to develop a
resilient production system where production in one state can make up for shortfalls
elsewhere. But states might be reluctant to embark on such subsidies if they felt they
could simply “free ride” on other states—relying on production in other states during
adverse climate events without having to pay subsidies out of their own coffers for
production in their state. How, then, to ensure what in takings law is famously termed an
“average reciprocity of advantage,” where each state is both benefitted and burdened in
roughly equal measure? States would have to either feel that the subsidies carried added
benefits—such as being advantageous to a politically powerful sector of the state
economy—or had fewer costs—such as if the subsidies originated from outside the state,
namely from the federal government.
Finally, to the extent there remains some question whether state subsidies—even
those out of general revenue—would survive Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny, this
Paper offers another reason to resolve such a question in favor of allowing subsidies.141
While on the surface there appears to be little economic distinction between a subsidy
and a tax—as favoring in-state producers and disfavoring out-of-state producers amounts
to the same thing—there are good reasons to believe, in the food production context, that
state subsidies are superior to taxes and should be allowed even if taxes are not.
c.

Discriminatory Taxes

The third broad category of state action is obviously the most problematic under
current Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence: states levying taxes or fees on out-ofstate crops. Even putting aside the Dormant Commerce Clause issues, it is not clear how
effective such a strategy would be in fostering local production. The reasons are severalfold. First, for a state tax of this sort to be effective, it would have to promote in-state
production, either by shielding current in-state producers from outside crops that would
undercut them on price, or by spurring new in-state production that suddenly becomes
competitive due to the tax. However, for this to occur, there must be a viable equivalent
or substitute crop that can be grown in-state. For example, a tax on out-of-state corn
might help local farmers if passed by New Mexico or Florida—states with minor corn
production—but not if passed by Alaska, a state with no real corn production and little
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current prospect for such production.142 The response, of course, is that Alaska would be
unlikely to tax corn if it did not benefit local farmers, although the state may have other
reasons for doing so, such as pure revenue generation or even an attempt to depress
demand for corn for other reasons, such as the interests of the fossil fuel industry.143
Second, taxes on out-of-state food are likely to disproportionately affect crops that
are shipped across state lines and sold as food, and not crops that are used as inputs to
other food production or industrial processes. For example, North Carolina might tax outof-state apples in order to protect local orchards, but it is less likely to tax apple juice,
apple sauce, or any of the other products made from apples. Depending on the relative
share of fresh versus processed products, this means that local producers might still be
uncompetitive in the primary market for the crop.
Third, taxes on out-of-state food might help local farmers compete in the in-state
market, but they would not necessarily help local farmers compete in markets in other
states, where their goods would still be non-competitive. In other words, a tax is meant to
encourage local consumption of local goods, but it will not help local goods become
consumed elsewhere, which might be a problem if the primary consumption markets are
elsewhere. Indeed, one longstanding danger of discriminatory taxes is that they would
lead other states to impose their own taxes, making every state’s products less
competitive in other states. 144 This might lead to a situation where, in the case of a
climate wipe-out in one state, other states’ goods might be less available to that states’
consumers to make up the shortfall.
In the end, it appears that discriminatory taxes, while perhaps the easiest kind of
measure for states to pass politically, would both be the most vulnerable to Dormant
Commerce Clause challenge and the least likely to succeed from a policy perspective.
While Congress could certainly overcome the Dormant Commerce Clause issue by
passing a law allowing states to implement such discriminatory taxes—and courts could
overcome it on their own by “softening” the doctrine—it remains the fact that such a
policy is not as well-suited to the goal of distributed production as the subsidy scheme
described previously.
The question becomes, then, whether states should be able to enact discriminatory
taxes if subsidies are unrealistic. Discriminatory taxation may be inferior to subsidies, but
may be superior to doing nothing. While a discriminatory tax scheme would essentially
raise average food prices, it would, to the extent it is effective, represent a trade-off
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between such higher average prices and some insulation from price shocks.145 In other
words, the fact that it raises prices is not itself a reason to disfavor a discriminatory tax
scheme.
Elsewhere, Professor David Dana and I have argued for viewing Dormant
Commerce Clause cases through a climate change “lens”—noting how seemingly like
products can be quite unlike when climate change is taken into account in their
production processes. 146 In the course of that Paper, we explored the idea of local
production fostering climate resiliency in the context of energy production.147 We argued
that “for any given mix of energy production, local sources will always be more climateresilient than distant sources.”148 A discriminatory taxation scheme might also be viewed
through a climate change lens to the extent that a local food product is not “like” a more
distantly produced one given the transportation costs and the climate vulnerabilities
engendered by such distant production.149 In other words, California might conclude that
a California tomato and a Florida tomato are not “like” products, and hence might be
justified in taxing the Florida tomato, if the California tomato is grown with a smaller
climate footprint or might be a useful element of the state’s climate resilience strategy.
V.

MAKING SUBSIDIES WORK

Putting aside the issue of whether states should be allowed to enact discriminatory
taxes, there may be ways to make subsidies work that would make them more politically
and economically palatable to states.150 As noted previously, one of the greatest hurdles
faced by subsidies would appear to be the fact that they cost the states money. Another
hurdle is that the granting state does not capture the full benefits.
Both of these hurdles, and any Dormant Commerce Clause issues, can be overcome
if such subsidies are paid for by the federal government. Of course, the federal
government already provides tremendous subsidies to farmers on its own, and a small
amount of such subsidies are already tailored to local production in such places as the
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farm to school grant program.151 But if we wish to encourage local production on the
scale that is required, at least some large proportion of overall farm subsidies could be
transferred to the states as block grants for the purpose of having the states foster in-state
food production. The “block grant” idea is one that political conservatives have recently
favored in areas such as health care,152 and indeed the idea, to the extent that it comports
with conservative notions of federalism, might provide a politically plausible way to
changing farm subsidies in a way that also fosters climate resilience. In this way, the
subsidies could be spread out geographically instead of concentrated in the major food
production areas. Politically, this means that some states with current high concentrations
of farm subsidies might become net losers while other states would become net winners.
The block grants could also be tailored to foster a greater diversity of food crops,
either diversity within a crop—such as different varieties of corn—or diversity among
crops. Indeed, one of the appealing aspects of a subsidy scheme is the fact that it could be
tailored to express a wide range of policy goals and could be changed year-to-year, or
even more frequently if they are in the hands of an agency. This of course could also be a
danger—that the block grants would be hijacked for other purposes—but at the very least
they would help foster some greater geographic and genetic diversity in order to help
withstand the unpredictable nature of the climate events that threaten food security.
Moreover, it is worth reiterating that federal subsidies given to states for purposes
of fostering local production would face no Dormant Commerce Clause issues at all, as
the federal government is not subject to that doctrine’s strictures.153 It is only when states
initiate their own subsidy programs that there is even a question concerning the
doctrine.154 And to the extent that there is any doubt concerning the viability of such state
subsidies, the Dormant Commerce Clause can certainly be “clarified”—or indeed
“softened”—to make room for such policy choices.
VI.

CONCLUSION

There are obviously many critical issues that need to be addressed before building a
truly climate-resilient agricultural system. Such issues include: rethinking federal farm
subsidies, international trade rules, and antitrust issues among seed and processing
companies. In this Paper, I have attempted to illuminate one aspect of this daunting
challenge: the importance of geographic and genetic diversity and the extent to which
such diversity can be fostered by states giving preferential treatment to local farms, and
how different forms of such treatment might be viewed by courts under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, either as that clause is currently construed or under a “softened”
See Farm to School Act of 2017, supra note 125 (noting that “[i]n the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of
2010, Congress established mandatory funding of $5 million annually for a farm to school competitive
grant and technical assistance program”).
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version. The diversity issue is critical given the multitude of unpredictable climate threats
faced by our agricultural system, and there is a great deal the states can do to foster such
diversity, most notably to subsidize local agriculture. While such local subsidies are
likely to withstand scrutiny, even under current interpretations of the Dormant Commerce
Clause—and certainly the doctrine should be clarified to erase any lingering doubts—the
federal government can overcome this and other challenges to local subsidy schemes by
transforming at least part of its farm subsidy program into a “block grant” program that
would allow states to subsidize in-state food production. This might actually be
politically plausible given the current Republican preference for block grants, and it
would certainly be a useful first step in fostering the climate resilience that is currently
lacking in the U.S. agricultural sector.
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